The Collapse of the International Tin Agreement by Prest, Michael
The Collapse of the International Tin Agreement
Michael Prest
Introduction
Early on the morning of 24 October 1985 Michael
Brown, chief executive of the London Metal
Exchange, was sitting in his office chatting to the
chairman of the exchange's committee, Ted Jordan.
The telephone range. It was Pieter de Koning, the
International Tin Council's buffer stock manager and
the most powerful person in the world tin market.
There was a brief conversation. Brown recalls: 'I
turned to Ted and said "de Koning has suspended
trading".'
In that instant both realised that chaos threatened.
Their immediate concern was the LME and its
members. They knew that around half of the LME's 27
ring dealing members' were heavily involved with the
buffer stock. They also suspected that de Koning's
careful word 'suspend' was code for defaulting on his
outstanding positions with those firms. There could
only be one reason for the buffer stock withdrawing
from the market: incredible as it might seem, a body
backed by 22 sovereign states had run out of money.
Tin was the least traded of the LME's seven metals,
but it was immediately obvious that a big default
would damage the reputation of the exchange and
perhaps of the City of London as an international
centre for commodity trading. After a quick
consultation with Jacques Lion, the chairman of the
LME board, trading in the tin contract was stopped.
By suspending trading the exchange locked itself and
its members into the most serious crisis to afflict
commodity trading for half a century, from which
neither it nor its members has recovered. Worse from
its standpoint, the LME became an increasingly
LME membership is divided into two main categories: 22 active ring
dealing members and 63 non-ring dealing members. There are also
36 individual subscribers and 12 honorary members. Ring dealing
members, who numbered 27 when the crisis broke, are firms allowed
to deal directly on the floor or 'ring' of the exchange. Non-ring
dealing members may deal directly with other exchange members
but have to put ring dealing business through ring dealing members.
All the ring dealing members are owned by bigger companies.
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unimportant part of an international dispute which it
only dimly understood. The field was quickly
dominated by national governments, big banks, and in
the background the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.
For the LME the issues were the sanctity of contract
and the preservation of the exchange. But for the other
participants it was a matter of realpolitik, in which the
stakes were the future of international commodity
agreements, the debt crisis, and relations between
developing commodity producing countries and
industrial consumers of commodities. What originated
as a commercial dispute - the announcement by the
ITC that it could not pay its debts - rapidly
intensified and expanded into a test case of the ability
of commodity agreements to survive in adverse
market conditions. The ITC seems to have failed the
test.
For what nobody - except perhaps a few ITC officials
- could have known that morning was what the
technical suspension of the buffer stock's trading
would reveal. Least of all did they anticipate a six
month crisis, at the end of which the ITC's members2
- which included all the then members of the
European Community - would refuse to honour fully
debts of9OO mn. As legal actions against the ITC and
member countries, including Britain, now accumulate,
we can begin to count the cost of the loss of public faith
in commodity agreements. Has the ITC's pleading
diplomatic immunity as the reason for not paying its
debts undermined well-intentioned efforts to introduce
some order into commodity trading and prices, and if
so by how much?
2 The 22 members of the ITC are divided into two groups. The six
producer members are Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Thailand, and Zaire. The 16 consumer members are Canada, the
European Economic Community (Belgium/Luxembourg, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
United Kingdom), Finland, India, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland. The United States and Bolivia were members until
1982. The EEC participates as an inter-governmental organistion.
The Background
In fact, relations between the LME as the main free
market price-setting mechanism for tin and the ITC
and some of its more prominent members, notably
Malaysia, had been poor for several years. There had
been open animosity in 1982 when continuous heavy
buying of tin had by February of that year forced the
LME cash price of tin to almost £9,000 a tonne, a
premium or 'backwardation' ofl,000 over the price
for delivery in three months, and a rise of 30 per cent in
a year. A backwardation is so called because futures
prices normally command a premium over cash prices
to allow for interest, storage, insurance and similar
costs.
The buying looked suspiciously like an attempt to
corner the world tin market. Although it was
conducted from Switzerland, there was substantial
evidence that it was done with the knowledge of, if not
the actual approval and financial support of, the
Malaysian government. This crisis came to a head
when the LME authorities limited by rule the size of
the backwardation. This meant that traders with
forward commitments to sell tin did not have to pay to
the mysterious holder of tin a monopoly price for the
metal they needed to fulfill their contracts. The heat
was taken out of the market and within a fortnight the
three-months price had fallen by almost £2,000 a
tonne. But the LME was bitterly attacked by senior
Malaysian politicians.
In retrospect, moreover, the affair sowed the seeds of
the much bigger disaster which was to follow four
years later. Publicly it highlighted the tension between
an exchange founded a century ago at the height of
laissez-faire and still run as a cross between a
gentleman's club and a bazaar, and a post-war inter-
governmental body founded on the principle of
regulating the consequences of supply and demand.
Mistrust and misunderstanding was to be expected,
yet the two organisations had coexisted for 30 years
and had even come to depend on each other.
Privately, behind the closed doors of the ITC, it
widened the gap between consumer and producer
members and even caused some producers such as
Indonesia and Thailand, fearful of Malaysia's power
as the world's biggest tin producer, to question
Malaysia's motives. At one stage in 1982 there was
genuine concern that the International Tin Agreement
would not be renewed. All these divisions and
problems had two common roots: the changing




Tin is one of the oldest known metals. Its low melting
point, common occurrence, and ease of working made
the metal simple to produce and turn into instruments.
Tools and weapons were made from bronze (an alloy
of tin and copper) in the fourth millenium BC. The
Roman writer Pliny described in AD79 the alloy of
lead and tin which we call solder and which is still a
major end use for tin. The biggest major modern use,
tinplate, was first mentioned in the 17th century. An
important characteristic of tin is that most of its
applications need only small quantities of the metal.
This, along with geographical fluctuations in sources
of supply, meant that tin was traded from very early
times. The famous example is the Phoenicians buying
tin in Cornwall for sale in the Mediterranean.
A free market in the metal, whether the price was set
on a recognised exchange or not, therefore antedated
by centuries international attempts to control the
price. In the modern world, moreover, reserves of tin
are substantial, and it is not a commodity likely to
suffer geological exhaustion. According to the United
States Bureau of Mines [Roskill 1985] total reserves
and resources are more than 38 mn tonnes - enough
at current consumption rates to last 150 years.
Concentration of Production
The contemporary tin market has several key
characteristics which make it an almost ideal case
study of commodity relations between developing and
developed countries, regardless of whether events had
brought the issue to a head.
First, unlike other important and widely traded
industrial base metals such as copper, production of
tin is still quite concentrated in a handful of
developing countries. Of world mine production of
about 214,000 tonnes in 1983 half came from three
countries in South-East Asia - Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand. Despite its steadily falling market
share, Malaysia is still the biggest single producer,
with a fifth of mine output. South and Central
America accounted for another fifth (Bolivia 12 per
cent). China was responsible for more than eight per
cent. The only two developed countries which figured
significantly were the Soviet Union, whose nine per
cent share is not traded on the world market, and
Australia which mined five per cent of the total
[Roskill 19851.
Concentration of Consumption
Second, the obverse of concentration of production is
concentration of consumption. The consumers of tin
concentrates and refined metal exported by the
producing countries are mainly industrial nations.
Thus the United States (which produces virtually no
tin at all), Japan, France, West Germany, Italy and the
United Kingdom make up more than half of world
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consumption. If one includes the whole European
Economic Community, the proportion rises to two-
thirds. If one then allows that the centrally planned
economies import about 13 per cent of all tin metal
traded there is little left for developing countries
[Roskill 19851. This pattern has persisted since before
the beginning of the century and has changed only to
the extent that producing countries now refine most of
their mine concentrates into tin metal before export
and that tin mining in three of the biggest producers
(Malaysia, Indonesia and Bolivia) is now state-
controlled.
Vulnerability of Tin Producers
Third, tin producers are very vulnerable to the
fluctuating economic, and particularly industrial,
fortunes of their developed customers. Demand for tin
obviously depends upon the health of the consuming
economy. But since the oil price increases of 1973/74 it
has also become more dependent on the changing
structure of developed economies - not just their
aggregate output - and on technological and market
changes within the industrial sector itself. For
example, recent expansion in developed economies
has been generated more by services than by industry.
Demand for raw materials is therefore growing more
slowly than are OECD economies as a whole - as the
prevailing lowest real commodity prices this century
indicate.
Technological and marketing changes have also
severely affected demand fortin. But rival materials to
tinplate - aluminium and plastics (there is even a
prototype plastic Coca Cola can!) - have eroded the
market share. Improved technology has enabled
tinplate to be made with less tin. Since 1973 the
percentage of tin used in tinplate has fallen from 37 per
cent to barely 30 per cent, not much more than solder,
the second main end use. Two other factors in tin's
decline have been its high price relative to competitors
and the huge American strategic stockpile (see below).
The Fall in Tin Consumption
The net effect of all these factors has been a steady fall
in tin consumption for more than a decade. From 1945
to its peak in 1974 demand for tin advanced with few
setbacks from 97,300 tonnes a year to more than
200,000 tonnes. In 19 of those years demand exceeded
supply, especially during the long economic boom of
the 1960s. But since 1974 the picture has been very
different. Not only has consumption fallen to an
estimated 165,000 tonnes in 1985, but the surplus years
outnumbered the deficit years. It was against this
unfavourable background that the ITC tried to
maintain a tin price and the International Tin
Agreement.
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The International Tin Agreement
Early Tin Agreements
As the abandoned mineworkings which dominate the
landscape of west Cornwall show, the tin market has
been prone to instability for a very long time. After
several short-lived efforts in the late 1920s and in the
1930s to regulate the price, Malaya, Nigeria, the Dutch
East Indies and Bolivia signed in 1931 the first
international tin agreement. A subsequent tin
agreement lasted until December 1941 and included
for the first time the two biggest tin consumers, the
United States and Britain.
American involvement in the tin agreement resembles
the ambiguity of that country's contemporary attitude
towards commodity pacts. The original motive, which
owed much to the spirit of the New Deal era, was to
encourage an orderly recovery from the slump. But the
outbreak of the Second World War concentrated
American minds on the strategic importance of tin. In
1940 the United States decided to accumulate a tin
stockpile of 75,000 tonnes, to be run by the General
Services Administration (GSA). Production soared
and just before Japan overran the mines of South-East
Asia it reached a record level of 223,000 tonnes a year.
Japan's entry into the war and the loss of tin supplies
from Asia seemed to justify the American decision to
build up a tin stockpile. But it was to prove part of the
ITA's undoing.
That, however, was still a long way off. In the years
just after the war the Asian mines were quickly
rehabilitated and by 1948 production was already
exceeding consumption. In 1950 the producers agreed
at a UN conference on tin that production cuts were
necessary. The United States opposed cuts, however,
because it was still buying tin and feared a shortage. In
the event, the Korean War stimulated a new boom.
The First International Tin Agreement and its
Successors
A second UN conference, in 1973, was more fruitful.
The Korean war had ended and the United States,
having accumulated a tin mountain of 40,000 tonnes
more than the original target, was in a more
cooperative mood. The outcome of the conference was
the First International Tin Agreement, which came
into force on 1 July 1956. From the start the ITA
looked strong. It included all the major western tin
producers and consumers, brought together in the
more optimistic and liberal atmosphere which then
prevailed. It incorporated a target price range to be
defended by both a buffer stock and production or
export quotas, and also boasted the enlightened
feature of giving the producer and consumer groups,
into which it was divided, equal votes.
Producers and consumers subscribed funds to the
agreement according to their percentage share of
output or use. The first use for these funds was the
purchase of 23,700 tonnes of tin to start the buffer
stock. A permanent secretariat was formed in London
to administer the agreement.
In 1972, the council and its employees were granted (or
so it was assumed) diplomatic immunity by the British
government's International Tin Council (Immunities
and Privileges) Order. Successive five-year agreements
were negotiated smoothly enough, and after the
formation of UNCTAD in 1964 were conducted under
its auspices and with its advice. Indeed, the duration
and apparent solidity of the tin agreement made it a
model of how such things should be done and
consequently a cornerstone of UNCTAD's ambitious
Integrated Programme. For more than 20 years there
was little hint that all these strengths could be
transformed into weaknesses.
Naturally, there were problems. The inherent
instability of the tin market asserted itself repeatedly.
Export controls were imposed in 1958, 1968, 1973,
1975 and 1982. For much of the period after the
founding of the ITA, however, their imposition was
the result not of the commercial balance in the market
but of the GSA's buffer stock.
The United States Stockpile
Although the United States was closely involved with
the agreements, it managed the GSA buffer stock
without reference to ITA operations. By the time the
GSA finally stopped buying tin in 1955 it had
accumulated vastly more than had been envisaged.
The very existence of what tin traders sardonically
called the world's biggest tin mine was enough to
distort the market.
But the cessation of GSA buying was in fact the ITA's
baptism by fire. The ensuing price collapse forced the
first imposition of export controls in 1958. The
cumulative disposals that followed were the proximate
cause of the imposition of ITC export controls on a
number of subsequent occasions.
In the 1970s, the timing of GSA sales could hardly
have been worse. When inflation was rampant tin
prices soared, along with other raw material prices. A
depreciating pound supported London prices. Between
1974 and 1981, when GSA sales were resumed, the
London price more or less doubled from an annual
average of £3,494 a tonne to £7,085. The Kuala
Lumpur price rose from M$18.8 a kilogramme to
M$32.34. Ifever there was a time when the GSA could
have acted responsibly in the market it was then.
For most of the time the price was near or even above
the ceiling of the range in which the buffer stock
manager was allowed to intervene. Under ITA rules
the manager was obliged to sell tin from his stock to
try to keep the price within the agreed range. By 1977
the strain had become too great and stocks were
exhausted. Only the GSA could stop prices going up
further - which they did - with the consequence that
tin production was stimulated. The period 1978 to
1982 saw unrelenting overproduction of tin as ever
higher prices depressed demand. This combination of
very high prices, low demand, and rising private stocks
occurred while the United States was a member of the
ITA but while the GSA was absent from the market.
They were fertile conditions for disaster.
The Collapse
The sixth ITA suffered a difficult birth. As the
ratification deadline of 30 June 1982 approached
negotiations almost broke down. The United States
refused to join, a concrete expression of the first
Reagan administration's hostility to commodity
agreements. Bolivia, afraid that export controls could
inhibit its earnings of desperately needed hard
currency, also refused to join. Malaysia was both
pushing for a higher intervention price and trying to
start a cartel of producers without consumers in the
belief that direct dealing with consumers bypassing the
LME would keep prices higher. Everything was
overshadowed by the LME manipulation and by the
parlous financial condition of the buffer stock, which
was nevertheless obliged to buy some 50,000 tonnes of
tin unloaded by the failed market operators. This tin
formed the basis of the Sixth ITA buffer stock.
Attempts by the producers to raise the buffer stock
intervention range were successfully resisted by
consumers who argued that in the current oversupplied
market tin was too expensive, even though prices had
fallen to their lowest for five years in the wake of the
LME fiasco. In a fateful move it was also agreed to
allow the buffer stock manager to borrow commercially
against the security of his stocks. Eventually a cliff-
hanging meeting in Geneva under the auspices of
UNCTAD agreed to bring the Sixth ITA into
operation without the required number of votes.
It was not an auspicious start. Within days the ITC
agreed to impose a 36 per cent cut in tin exports.
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand announced that
they would form an Association of Tin Producing
Countries, although stressing that the ATPC was not
meant to be a 'tinpec'. There was dissension between
the majority among the EEC consumers and Britain
and Germany who were suspicious of Malaysia's role
in the LME manipulation and wanted guarantees that
the ITC would not abuse its market position.
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The Sixth ITA might nevertheless have worked had it
not been for three crucial factors: very low world
demand for tin, a rapid increase in production by
countries outside the ITA coupled with smuggling
from ITC producers, and adverse currency movements.
Low Demand
In 1982 and 1983 consumption of around 154,000
tonnes was the lowest since 1959. By 1985 it had
struggled back to the 1980 level of 175,000 tonnes. In
1984 and 1985 several years of draconian export
controls - quotas were increased to 39.5 per cent
- combined with stronger developed country
economic growth to cause modest supply deficits. But
it was too late. By that time huge stocks had
accumulated at minehead, in LME warehouses, and
above all with the ITC. In May 1985 it was reported3
that over the previous three years the buffer stock had
bought 60,000 tonnes - more than a third of annual
consumption - which at the then record prices was
worth £600 mn. Financing this stockpile broke the
buffer stock.
Production Outside the ITC
Nor was the reluctance of ITC members effectively to
curtail output the buffer stock manager's only
problem. The high prices which the agreement had
been so successful in engineering during the 1970s had
stimulated production in countries outside the
agreement, chiefly Brazil and China. In 1981 the ITC
nominally still had 71 per cent of world tin production
under its sway. Within only four years the percentage
had been eroded to 57.
Tin smuggling is by definition hard to assess
accurately, although it has gone on for many years.
Private information to the writer suggests, however,
that it was running at an annual rate of some
12,000 tonnes in the mid-1980s and may even have
reached 20,000 tonnes, despite special efforts by the
ITC to curb it.
Most of the smuggling is from Thailand where a
sizeable part of tin mining is controlled by what
amounts to organised crime beyond government
control. The tin is sent to Singapore where it is smelted
and sold as Malaysian material. In normal times this
smuggling might not have mattered, and would de
facto have been just another part of the market. But in
1985 it was a problem the buffer stock manager could
do without.
Currency Swings
What in the end made financing the stockpile and
soaking up all the extra tin in the world impossible was
Financial Times, 17 May 1985.
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the appreciation of sterling against the Malaysian
ringgit.
In 1972, at the instigation of its largest producer, the
ITC decided to denominate the buffer stock price
range in Malaysian ringgits. The floor price to be
defended became the Kuala Lumpur tin price, even
though the bulk of world tin trading was done through
the LME. But buffer stock operations would still be
conducted in sterling. Currency exposure was
therefore an integral part of the ITC. Not only was the
buffer stock exposed to arbitrage (buying and selling
to take advantage of price differences between centres)
between London and Kuala Lumpur but part of the
arbitrage was caused by currency movements outside
the manager's control.
The core of the problem was that the Malaysian dollar
is closely linked to the US dollar. So when the US
dollar was strong and appreciating the Malaysian
currency went up with it. A strong local currency
generally keeps down local commodity prices
expressed in other currencies (in this case, sterling).
This tended to put pressure on the Kuala Lumpur
floor price. But the obverse of the strong dollar was a
weak pound sterling and high and rising nominal
prices on the LME. Consequently, as we have seen,
London tin prices reached record levels in late 1984
and early 1985 despite unfavourable supply and
demand and stock balances. Since the buffer stock had
bought its tin in 1982 at around £7,000 a tonne, prices
of9,000 or more allowed the buffer stock manager to
show handsome paper profits. He borrowed against
these illusory gains to finance support for the Kuala
Lumpur floor price, which he was obliged by the ITA
to do.
Then, abruptly, in early 1985 the whole process went
into reverse. Sterling rose from almost parity with the
dollar to $1.40. Between February and October the
LME tin price collapsed by virtually £2,000 a tonne to
£8,140 on the morning of 24 October. Pieter de Koning
tried to stem the tide by persuading the ITC in March
to allow him to trade below the Kuala Lumpur floor
price. His logic was that the cost of his London
collateral being devalued was much greater than the
incremental cost of supporting the Malaysian price.
Weakening prices tempted speculators to sell tin short
- to sell tin they did not own in the hope that by the
time the contracts fell due the price would have fallen
below the contract price. The buffer stock executed a
devastating squeeze on the market at the end of June
by insisting that traders who had agreed three months
earlier to sell to it should provide metal, not cash. But
the only source of so much spot tin was the ITC itself.
The old animosity between the LME and the ITC
flared up again as the LME limited the backwardation
which developed. The public row which ensued
between de Koning and the LME authorities was
reminiscent of 1982.
Not that de Koning had lacked ingenuity. As tne later
audit of the ITC by the accountants Peat Marwick
Mitchell showed, the buffer stock had entered into a
complex web of deals with metal brokers, mainly on
the LME. In essence these arrangements enabled the
buffer stock to stretch its already thin finances, with
the incidental advantage of disguising how thin they
were, and take on more tin that would otherwise have
been possible. One device was to borrow money from
brokers to buy more tin, often from the same brokers
who lent the money. Another was to 'borrow' tin in
such a way that the buffers stock paid only interest and
a premium rather than the full cost of outright
purchase. Several LME brokers were only too happy
to do business with the ITC. Metal markets generally
were depressed, and at the very high prices prevailing
in mid-1985 the buffer stock was just about the only
buyer. After all, was it not backed by 22 sovereign
states?
But however ingenious his defence of the price, the
buffer stock manager's position was fatally under-
mined by the relentless fall in London prices which
prompted margin calls from his brokers and calls for
more collateral from his bankers. As early as March
the ITC support operation had lost £20 mn. In
September the ATPC pledged £60 mn to the buffer
stock. Most of the money never arrived, although it
might have sustained the operation for another six
months. Squeezed in this pincer the ITC buffer stock
simply ran out of money on the morning of 24 October.
The Default
What happened thereafter has been well chronicled in
the press.4 After months of frustrating prevarications
during which tin trading virtually stopped because
nobody could be sure of the price, the ITC failed to
agree on how to refinance its debts of £900 mn.
Neither the diplomacy of the British government the
only developed country which said it would pay its
share of the debts - nor the ingenuity of the ITC's
creditors led by Standard Chartered Bank at the
suggestion of the Bank of England could create a
consensus at the ITC. In December the ITC went into
a supposedly open-ended session to bring about a
solution. But after its failure to agree the deadlock was
broken on 12 March by the LME enforcing a
settlement between its members of all outstanding tin
contracts, including those with the ITC. At the time of
writing, tin is trading at around half its suspension
price of £8,140 a tonne.
See particularly The Times and Financial Times between October
1985 and April 1986.
The Times 2 December 1985 and Financial Times 5 December 1985.
The failure of 22 countries, several of them rich
nations prone to lecturing the Third World on
financial probity, was all the more extraordinary given
the desperation of creditor banks and brokers to settle.
The plan which eventually emerged by January 1986
was that a company - first called Newco and later
Tinco - would be set up to take on all the ITC's
80,000 tonnes of tin. Tinco would be capitalised with
£200 mn subscribed in equal measure by ITC
consumer and producer members, £70 mn from the
banks and brokers, and £50 mn of loan capital from
the British government. In return the ITC would be
freed of all obligations and Tinco would oversee an
orderly disposal of the tin. By the end of the haggling
in early March the creditors had agreed to increase
their share to at least £100 mn, with a corresponding
reduction in the ITC's share of Tinco's capitalisation.
Even that 'burden sharing' was not enough.
The ITC's Debts
Two aspects of the default - probably the biggest in
commercial history - deserve attention: the details of
what the ITC owed, and why the default occurred.
On 24 October the ITC held 52,540 tonnes of physical
tin. If all pending transactions had been completed,
the buffer stock's net holding would have been
49,590 tonnes (worth £400 mn at the suspension
price). The frightening aspect of the figures, however,
was that the buffer stock would have incurred by the
end of January debts of £900 mn, of which £281 mn
would have been to 14 creditor banks and the rest to
metal traders. With the value of its collateral falling
continuously, there was no way these debts could have
been met, except by the members subscribing more
funds to the council. The LME settlement of March at
a set price of £6,250 a tonne left the ITC owing metal
brokers £180 mn.
The Debtors' Motives
The argument put forward unofficially by several
members, notably Germany, France and the Nether-
lands, was that the council enjoyed diplomatic
immunity: it could not be prosecuted for its debts.
Indeed, one remarkable discovery in the ITA was that
it contained no provision for bankruptcy, an
optimistic piece of drafting for which UNCTAD must
assume some responsibility. Legal opinion differs on
the degree of immunity the ITC enjoys and certainly
the British government has been advised that the
immunity is not watertight. As brokers bring actions
against tite ITC and its members this will be tested.
But whether or not the lTG enjoys diplomatic
immunity begs the question of why members chose to
hide behind it. The more charitable explanation is that
the customary working method of the lTG made
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agreement difficult to reach. The usual procedure was
to discuss business until a consensus emerged. It was a
method plainly ill-suited to a crisis, especially one
which appears to have caught many members
unawares. The argument made by some European
countries that this was a British crisis and that the
main interest of the British government was to protect
the LME was probably little more than an excuse.
Whatever the ITC's mechanisms, and whatever
members knew about what was going on, there was
considerable reluctance from the outset to meet the
debts. Significantly, the lTG did not say immediately
We will honour all obligations freely entered into' and
then work out how to do it. To the author, who
covered the crisis as a reporter from beginning to end,
there was from a very early stage the smell of default in
the air. Yet one suspended judgement simply because
the very idea of so big a default by such debtors was
almost unthinkable.
One factor which made it so, apart from straight-
forward commercial considerations, was that only
three years earlier these same countries had solemnly
brought the Sixth ITA into being. France and the
Netherlands, had even made special contributions to
smooth the path. What had changed?
One major change between 1982 and 1985 was a
hardening of government attitudes towards com-
munity pacts as all raw material prices fell, led by
OPEC, and the decline into ineffectiveness if not
disuse of most commodity agreements (coffee perhaps
being the exception). The other important change was
specific to tin. Tin stocks mounted and the market was
continuously oversupplied yet prices rose. An
agreement unable to maintain sensible prices could
not properly serve the interests of producer or
consumer.
The impression of a lapse of attention if not downright
negligence on the part of ITC members is reinforced
by their reactions to the audit. A swift reaction was to
accuse the buffer stock manager of trading beyond his
remit. But it was the responsibility of the members to
peruse this vital part of the agreement. In its reply to
the Select Committee on Trade and Industry, which
was highly critical of the British government's role in
the crisis, the government claimed that its delegates
reported fully the situation in the lTG and that
warnings of possible financial problems were
transmitted to the City via the Bank of England.6 It is
understood, however, that the delegate's reports were
6 House of Commons Paper 457. Fifth SpeciaiReport from the Trade
and Industry Committee, session 1985-86, The Tin Crisis:
Observations by the Government on the Second Report of the Trade
and Industry Committee in Session 1985-86. ordered tobe printed 11
July 1986.
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so bland as to be unlikely to land on a minister's desk.
That successive British ministers were fully appraised
of an impending crisis in the lTG is very doubtful. It is
likely that the same was true in other countries,
particularly the consumers.
The Seventh ITA would have been due in happier
times to come into force next year. Nobody is rushing
to negotiate a new agreement, especially given the
complications of court proceedings by creditors. To
all intents and purposes, however, the 22 members
have turned their backs on the ITC and on the longest
running commodity agreement.
Conclusions
The immediate cause of the lTG's default was that too
many of its members did not believe it was worth
financing. The decision was taken in a climate very
different from that in which the ITC was born.
Commodity prices are structurally very low, as is faith
in the effectiveness of agreements. Some powerful
governments - notably Britain and the United States
- are more committed to free markets than were their
predecessors. Life has also been complicated for
commodity agreements by the revolution in financial
markets: colossal flows of capital around the world,
aided by technological advances and the lowering of
barriers to capital transfers, have created massive
speculative forces which nation states, let alone a
modestly funded commodity agreement, cannot resist.
But this does not explain what happened specifically
to the ITA. There are three main reasons for the
collapse, and each has its lesson.
First, the root of members' disenchantment with the
ITA was its meretricious success in keeping tin prices
high. In 1984 copper and lead prices measured in US
cents per pound were only 60 per cent higher than the
corresponding averages for 1956. Zinc and aluminium
were three times higher. But tin was six times higher
[Roskill 1985:1]. Why the consumer members of the
LTG agreed to support such unrealistic prices is a very
important question for future commodity agreements.
The lesson is that to succeed a commodity agreement
with economic (i.e. pricing) clauses must pitch its
intervention range reasonably in line with the market.
Surviving and meeting members' needs are better
served by aiming for price stability and a predictable
income than by forcing prices up.
Second, when the ITC started life it was a cartel with
the unusual feature of consumer members. But high
prices inevitably attracted other producers into the
market while also promoting consumers to ask
whether the agreement was in their interest. A
corollary is that as more developing countries exploit
their natural resources, commodity agreements of all
kinds will require so many members to be effective as
to be unwieldy. The coffee agreement, for example,
has difficulty policing all its members. The lesson is
that few agreements are likely to be comprehensive
enough to last long.
And third, it may be that as developing countries
diversify their economies, the need for commodity
agreements will diminish. When Malaysia helped set
up the ITC, tin accounted for almost a quarter of its
exports by value. By 1985 tin contributed only
three per cent. Commodities may still overall be a
significant part of Malaysia's foreign trade, but can
countries be expected to belong to a clutch of different
agreements? Malaysia has not joined OPEC for
instance. The lesson is that here lies a formidable
obstacle to the ambitions of the Integrated Fund.
In any case, such ambitions have been severely dented
by the tin fiasco. The tin price has collapsed to its
lowest real level since before the war, and the ITC's
default has brought misery to mining communities
around the world. Mines have closed, and weaker
economies such as Bolivia are endangered. Future
agreements will have to be very carefully drafted
indeed if fears of a similar default are to be allayed. A
cloud hangs over many intergovernmental organi-
sations, and not the least consequence of the default is
even greater caution by banks in lending. The ITC has
set back the cause of commodity agreements. Yet the
doubt remains that leaving commodity pricing to the
likes of the LME is no alternative.
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